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In the context of the financial crisis in Europe and drawing on social identity and 
perceived disadvantage literature, this research explored national identification, perceived 
prejudice, perceived ostracism, and anger as predictors of intentions to engage in normative 
collective action and support for non-normative, destructive action. Correlational data were 
collected in Greece (N = 218), Portugal (N = 312) and Italy (N = 211) during the financial 
crisis that affected several European countries in the early 2010’s. Hierarchical regressions 
showed that national identification, above and beyond all other variables, positively predicted 
normative collective action, and negatively predicted support for non-normative action. That 
is, people who identified more strongly with their national identity were more likely to report 
that they will engage in collective action to enhance the position of their ingroup, and less 
likely to support destructive collective action. Mediation analyses revealed that in the case of 
Portugal and Italy, national identification associated negatively with anger, while anger 
positively predicted normative collective action. The findings of this research point to the 
importance of national identification as a factor that, on the one hand, motivates people’s 
mobilisation toward supporting the rights of the ingroup but on the other hand, impedes the 
more negative, destructive side of collective action. The contextual and instrumental role of 
national identity in contexts of threat is discussed.  
 








The mobilising and protective role of national identification on normative and non-
normative collective action 
In the early 2010’s several European countries were subjected to a financial crisis 
that, to an extent, is still ongoing. Greece, Ireland and Portugal were most severely stricken 
by the crisis, while the economies of Italy, Spain and Cyprus were also affected. In April 
2010, the Greek government asked the International Monetary Fund and the European Union 
to put together a “rescue” package to assist the country’s economy. In 2011, the Portuguese 
government asked for a European Union-International Monetary Fund bailout. The loans 
from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund came with severe austerity 
measures. In 2011, also the Italian government pushed for substantial economic reforms to 
reduce public expenditure. The financial crisis in these countries had dramatic implications in 
terms of reductions in people’s income, exploding unemployment, cuts in public service, 
while in this context people actively redefined their ingroups and outgroups (Gkinopoulos & 
Hegarty, 2018). The acute austerity prompted civil unrest and a general sentiment of agony 
and discontent became salient (Papastamou, Valentim, Mari, & Marchand, 2018). During this 
period, anti-austerity protests were taking place regularly in the three countries, and civil 
movements such as the “Indignados” started emerging, indicating large-scale social 
mobilisation. Demonstrations, square sit-ins, marches and strikes took place in several cities 
in the three countries, while some protests turned violent (Bacchi, 2012; Dalakoglou, 2011; 
“EU against austerity: Protesters clash with police amid unrest in Spain, Portugal”, 2013; 
“Greece strike: Police and protesters clash in Athens”, 2011).   
In this context, where perceived disadvantage, protest movements and civil 
mobilisation were salient, we conducted our research simultaneously in Greece, Portugal and 
Italy. Drawing on recent advances on collective action literature from a social psychological 
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perspective, we examined the predictive roles of identity and cognitive and affective 
components of perceived disadvantage (perceived prejudice and ostracism, and anger, 
respectively) on (a) intentions to engage in normative collective action (such as participating 
in demonstrations, marches and writing of flyers) and (b) support for non-normative, 
disruptive action (such as destructive action that violates norms and/or breaks the law, see 
Becker & Tausch (2015). Specifically, we integrated social identity and social deprivation 
approaches to understand engagement in collective action and tested whether national 
identification, perceived prejudice and perceived ostracism by the European Union, and anger 
predict normative and non-normative collective action, and examined the generalizability of 
these predictive factors across the three countries. In addition, we tested anger, perceived 
discrimination and perceived ostracism as potential mediating mechanisms in the identity-
collective action path (in line with the social identity perspectives on collective action, Van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).  
The social psychological basis of normative collective action 
Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990) provide a comprehensible approach of when 
collective action at a group level takes place indicating that “a group member engages in 
collective action anytime that he or she is acting as a representative of the group and the 
action is directed at improving the condition of the entire group” (p. 995). Thus, collective 
action often aims at confronting injustice or disadvantage on the basis of a group 
membership. In the context of our research and in line with this definition, people in Greece, 
Portugal and Italy acted collectively to overcome the disadvantage stemming from the 
imposed austerity. Broadly speaking, collective action may conform to existing societal 
norms and rules or disobey them. In other words, collective action can take the form of 
normative mobilisations, such as peaceful sit-ins and marches, or non-normative, disruptive 
and violent acts (Martin & Murray, 1984).  
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The topic of collective action has been approached from various theoretical 
perspectives within social sciences. Research from the fields of sociology and political 
science tends to explore the societal and structural conditions that underlie people’s 
mobilisation (see Klandermans, 1997). Social psychological research focuses less on the 
structural conditions and more on the individual (i.e. subjective) factors that predict 
engagement in collective action (Corcoran, Pettinicchio, & Young, 2011; Van Zomeren, 
2013; Wright, 2009; for meta-analysis see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).  
With regard to the core psychological motivations that promote collective action, the 
central role of social identity, perceived disadvantage and anger have been highlighted 
(Klandermans, Van der Toorn, & van Stekelenburg, 2008; Tausch et al., 2011; Van Zomeren 
et al. 2008). People fundamentally perceive their social world in group terms so identifying 
with a group motivates behaviour and action that aims at the group’s interests (see social 
identity theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In an intergroup context of injustice, individuals’ 
identification with their disadvantaged group leads them to experience disadvantage as 
shared. Highly identified minority group members are more strongly motivated to enhance 
their group status (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008), especially when they perceive their 
disadvantaged status as illegitimate (Ellemers, 1993). Van Zomeren et al. (2008) showed in 
their meta-analysis that social identity is a moderate-sized predictor of collective action 
intentions and behaviour. When group identity is salient or threatened people react with 
strategies of resistance and competition (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).  
Research that looks into social identity as a motivator of collective action often 
explores people’s identification with certain protest or opinion-based movements (for 
example, a politicised protest movement in Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011; the 
‘United Nations’ Water for Life’ in Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012; for the role of 
politicised identity see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Turner-Zwinkels, Van Zomeren, & 
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Postmes, 2015) or ingroups that, arguably, do not necessarily evoke high levels of 
identification (such as being a student, for example in Becker et al., 2011). In our research we 
place the emphasis on national identity and argue its role will be particularly crucial in 
predicting collective action because it represents a highly meaningful social identity that 
motivates people’s attitudes and behaviours (Brown, 2000). In the countries affected by the 
financial crisis in Europe, national identification may be a particularly salient instigator of 
mobilisation. In other words, to the extent that national identity is central and meaningful for 
individuals (Brown, 2000; see also Emerson, 1962), collective action may represent the 
potent effort to enhance the position of one’s nation.   
When looking into the predictors of collective action, the literature also highlights the 
role of perceived disadvantage at an intergroup level (Walker & Smith, 2002; Wright & 
Tropp, 2002). Disadvantaged groups are motivated to enhance their social identity 
(Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006) and improve the group’s social position 
(Bobo, 1999; Mummendey, Kessler, Klick, & Mielke, 1999). Perceptions of injustice and 
unequal status predict collective action directly (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) and indirectly 
(Thomas, McGartny, & Mavor, 2009). Van Zomeren et al.’s meta-analysis (2008) found that 
perceived disadvantage is, like social identity, a moderate-sized predictor of collective action 
intentions and, to a lesser extent, behaviour. Building on this literature, we suggest that the 
subjective appreciation that one’s group faces disadvantage predicts collective action. We 
approach the concept of disadvantage from an intergroup relations perspective, tapping on the 
cognitive components of perceptions of prejudice and ostracism by the European Union, and 
the affective component of anger (Van Zomeren, 2013). Perceiving that one’s own nation is 
discriminated against and ostracized by other nations can reflect the relational nature of 
perceived disadvantage which can drive collective action. Similarly, anger represents an 
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affective reaction to perceived disadvantage, and among disadvantaged group members anger 
is a predictor of collective action (Tausch & Becker, 2012).   
Explicitly recognising the disadvantage or injustice targeting one’s group in the form 
of perception of prejudice can motivate collective action (Ellemers & Barreto, 2009; Liss, 
Crawford, & Popp 2004; Wright & Tropp, 2002). For example, Ellemers and Barreto (2009) 
looked into modern and old-fashioned sexism and argued that being able to perceive group-
level injustice (i.e. perceived sexism) motivates the emergence of collective action. 
Additionally, Friedman and Leaper (2010) found that experiences of gendered heterosexism 
(defined as sexist and heterosexist discrimination) was a significant predictor of collective 
action. Relative to our research, negative stereotyping often accompanied the portrayal of 
southern Europeans (for example, “lazy” and “disorganised”), while southern Europeans 
perceived the attitudes of other European Union countries as judgmental, negative and hostile 
(Van Vossole, 2016). In this setting, a generalised sense of collective disadvantage in relation 
to other European countries was salient (Lialiouti & Bithymitris, 2017).  
In the context of European Union, we suggest that disadvantage manifests not only as 
perceived prejudice but also as perceived ostracism by other country-members. Extensive 
research has demonstrated that ostracism threatens people’s fundamental needs, such as 
belonging, self-esteem, control, and the need for a meaningful existence (for review see 
Williams, 2007). Behavioural reactions to ostracism can range from pro-social in nature 
(Williams & Sommer, 1997), to socially avoidant to antisocial (Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 
2006; for review see Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). Twenge, Catanese, and Baumeister 
(2003) found that social exclusion can lead to self-defeating behaviours and Carter-Sowell, 
Chen, and Williams (2008) found that participants who were socially rejected became more 
socially susceptible, and thus more likely to become manipulated into performing undesirable 
acts. Furthermore, perceptions of rejection by the outgroup promoted minority groups’ ethnic 
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identification, a process that then increased support for political action to support the ingroup 
(Barlow, Sibley, & Hornsey, 2012). Based on the research reviewed above, we suggest that 
perceptions of prejudice and ostracism, both representing cognitive components of perceived 
disadvantage, will predict engagement in collective action in Greece, Portugal and Italy.  
The affective component of perceived disadvantage most closely linked to social 
mobilisation is anger. When seeking to restore justice anger is the most relevant emotion 
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Tausch & Becker, 2012) as it motivates people to act 
(Klandermans et al., 2008; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Yzerbyt, Dumont, 
Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, and Shepherd (2011) 
demonstrated that participants were more willing to engage in collective action when they 
shared the emotion of anger with other group members. Furthermore, Tausch et al. (2011) 
showed that anger predicts primarily normative action. Therefore, we suggest that the 
emotion of anger will be also a predictor of normative collective action in Greece, Portugal 
and Italy.   
Van Zomeren et al. (2008) focused on the psychological motivators of social 
mobilisation and theorised the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA), which 
places significant emphasis on the role of social identity and emotion relating to perceived 
injustice as predictors of collective action. The model, which also highlights the role of 
efficacy and was then extended to include morality as predictors of action (see Van Zomeren, 
2013), has received significant empirical support (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, & Heath, 2011; 
Chan, 2017; Thomas et al., 2012). Importantly, SIMCA proposes that social identity has a 
key role both as a direct predictor of action and an indirect one, exerting its effect via 
perceptions of disadvantage and reactions to it. Van Zomeren (2013) suggested that it is 
specifically group-based anger that mediates the relationship between social identity and 
action. For example, Van Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2008) found that those who 
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perceive their student identity as an important part of the self reported more anger following 
the threat to increase university fees, which then predicted collective action tendencies. Thus, 
we suggest that national identification will predict normative collective action directly, and 
indirectly via increasing perceptions of disadvantage and specifically perceived prejudice, 
ostracism and anger. 
Non-normative collective action 
In this research we explored predictors not only of intentions to engage in normative 
collective action but also of support for non-normative, disruptive action, a topic that has 
received less scholarly attention compared to more traditional forms of mobilisation. We 
argue that this is a particularly noteworthy research avenue, which becomes increasingly 
relevant to real-world phenomena such as riots and sympathy for extremism (Lyons-Padilla, 
Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & Va Egmond, 2015; see also Jasko, LaFree, & Kruglanski, 
2016). In relation to riots specifically, the Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd 
behaviour (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998a,b) has theorised 
that crowd events (such as riots) reflect the dynamic interactions between groups (for 
example, protesters versus police), and these interactions can eventually shape a new sense of 
social identity and collective action among crowd members. Relative deprivation has been 
theorised as a key variable instigating acts of violence (Martin & Murray, 1984). Experiences 
of discrimination have been found to predict violent behaviour (Caldwell, Kohn-Wood, 
Schmeelk-Cone, Chavous, & Zimmerman, 2004), while negative emotions such as contempt 
have been linked to non-normative action (Tausch et al., 2011). We therefore tested 
perceptions of prejudice and ostracism and anger as predictors of support for non-normative 
action. 
While the role of social identity in predicting social mobilisation is established (Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008), whether it also predicts non-normative, disruptive action is less clear. 
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Within the context of our research, we argue that identification with a meaningful group like 
that of one’s nation will predict (a) increased intentions to engage in normative action 
because this will likely enhance the rights of one’s nation and (b) decreased support for non-
normative action. We base this prediction on research that demonstrates the psychological 
benefits of group identification. A strong and positive ingroup affiliation is related to positive 
outcomes (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). A large body of research supports that a 
salient and meaningful social identity, for example an ethnic identity, can act protectively at 
an individual level, for example it can enhance mental health and reduce risk behaviours 
(Brook, Balka, Brook, Win, & Gursen, 1998; Klonoff, Landrine, & Ullman, 1999; Sellers, 
Linder, Martin, & Lewis, 2006). More relevant to non-normative, violent behaviours (albeit 
from an interpersonal perspective), Arbona, Jackson, McCoy, and Blakely (1999) found in a 
sample of Black American teenagers that ethnic identification was positively associated with 
attitudes against fighting. Thus, it appears that identifying with one’s ingroup, and 
specifically with one’s ethnic group, may protect against engaging in violent behaviours. In 
other words, we argue that feeling greater attachment to a meaningful ingroup, such as a 
national ingroup, will motivate people to try to protect the group’s rights when facing 
disadvantage via engaging in normative forms of collective action. However, and critically, 
since increased affiliation to one’s group is linked with supporting and protecting this group 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we expect that increased national identification will be associated 
with reduced support for non-normative collective action that can harm the disadvantaged 
group even further.    
The current research 
Our research explored intentions to engage in normative collective action and support 
for non-normative, disruptive collective action in the context of the financial crisis in Greece, 
Portugal and Italy, three country-members of the European Union. This context has 
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interesting connotations regarding not only people’s representations of factors that caused the 
crisis (e.g., individual behaviours or systemic issues) but also participatory activities that aim 
to challenge the crisis (Papastamou, Valentim, et al., 2018; Papastamou et al., 2018). 
Drawing upon the literature on perceived disadvantage (e.g., Ellemers & Barreto, 2009; 
Lialiouti & Bithymitris, 2017; Wright & Tropp, 2002) and the SIMCA (Van Zomeren et al., 
2008), we focused on the predictive roles of social identity, and cognitive and affective 
components of perceived disadvantage, that is perceived prejudice and ostracism by the 
European Union and anger, as predictors of intentions to engage in normative action. 
Contributing to the relatively scarce research on non-normative action we also tested the 
above variables as instigators of support for such action. Previous research has looked into 
identification with protest movements (such as Greenpeace) or with somewhat limited in 
scope identities (such as being a student) as a mobilising factor, however such identities may 
be marginal and not relevant to larger groups of people. In our research, we focused on the 
role of national identification as a more overarching and meaningful membership that can 
predict mobilisation intentions and support. This is a relevant social identity when 
considering the financial crisis in Europe, which affected profoundly specific countries. 
Furthermore, we examined the generalizability of the predictive role of the variables by 
conducting the research in three countries, i.e., Greece, Portugal and Italy, and testing our 
hypotheses separately in each country. We hypothesise that high levels of national 
identification will predict higher intentions to engage in normative collective action and less 
support for non-normative action. In line with SIMCA, we further expect that national 
identification will exert its effect via increasing cognitive and affective components of 
perceived disadvantage and specifically perceived prejudice, ostracism and anger.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
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Our sample consisted of 741 participants from Greece, Portugal and Italy who fully 
completed the measures under study. The Greek sample comprised 218 participants, 152 
females and 66 males (ages ranged from 18 to 67 years, M age = 28.96, SD = 12.04). The 
Portuguese sample comprised 312 participants, 189 females and 123 males (ages ranged from 
17 to 85 years, M age = 30.13, SD = 13.57). The Italian sample comprised 211 participants, 
159 females, 52 males (ages ranged from 18 to 70 years, M age = 32.50, SD = 13.90). 
University students and community participants were approached by research assistants and 
Lecturers in University lecture halls or via email lists, and were asked to complete a study 
regarding the current economic situation in their country (the study was conducted in 2012), 
either online or using a paper version, in the country’s native language (i.e. Greek, 
Portuguese and Italian respectively). The samples in Greece (M = 2.63, SD = .87), Portugal 
(M = 2.84, SD = .80) and Italy (M = 2.62, SD = .83) reported on average a left wing political 
orientation on a 5-point scale where 1 indicated extreme left, 3 indicated centre, and 5 
indicated extreme right; one sample-t-tests, t(217) = 44.63, p < .001, t(311) = 62.55, p < .001, 
t(210) = 45.41, p < .001 for Greece, Portugal and Italy respectively. To account for the role of 
political orientation on the study variables, we included it as a control variable in the main 
analyses.  
Measures1 
All measures were on a 7-point scale (1-7), with higher numbers indicating higher 
agreement with the statements.  
National identification. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agree 
with four items regarding their national identification (adapted from Branscombe et al., 
1993). Example items included: “I identify strongly with other [Greek/Portuguese/Italian] 
people”, “Being [Greek/Portuguese/Italian] is an important part of who I am (Greece α = .86, 
Portugal α = .78, Italy α = .90). 
13 
 
Perceived prejudice. Four items were used to measure perceived prejudice, with 
participants being asked to rate the extent to which they perceived that there is prejudice 
against people of their nationality (adapted from Operario & Fiske, 2001). Example items 
included: “In general, [Greek/Portuguese/Italian] people are viewed negatively”, “There is 
prejudice against [Greek/Portuguese/Italian] people” (Greece α = .78, Portugal α = .86, Italy 
α = .84).  
Perceived ostracism. Four items were used to measure perceived ostracism, with 
participants being asked to rate their agreement with items such as “[Greece/Portugal/Italy] is 
rejected by Europe”, “[Greece/Portugal/Italy] is isolated in Europe” (Greece α = .84, Portugal 
α = .91, Italy α = .91). 
To ensure that the perceived prejudice (four items) and perceived ostracism (four 
items) measures composed separate factors, principal component analysis with varimax 
rotation was performed to examine the underlying structure of the eight items, separately for 
the three countries. Two components with four items each were clearly identified in the case 
of every country. For Greece, Component 1, i.e. ‘perceived ostracism’, accounted for 46.81% 
of variance, while Component 2, i.e. ‘perceived prejudice’, accounted for 18.88% of 
variance. For Portugal, Component 1, accounted for 57.17% of variance, while Component 2 
accounted for 19.16% of variance. Similarly, for Italy, Component 1 accounted for 54.86% of 
variance, while Component 2 accounted for 18.99% of variance. 
Anger. Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they feel “angry” and 
“hostile” when thinking about the current situation in their country (Greece r = .40, p < .001, 
Portugal r = .60, p < .001, Italy r = .68, p < .001). 
Intentions to engage in normative collective action. Participants were asked to    
indicate how likely they are to participate in a series of eight actions to show their opinion 
regarding the situation in their country (adapted from Becker & Wright, 2011). Such actions 
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were, for example: demonstrations, strikes, writing of flyers (Greece α = .77, Portugal α = 
.62, Italy α = .78). 
Support for non-normative collective action. As the understanding of what can be 
considered as normative or non-normative collective action may vary across cultural 
contexts, different groups and inter-individually, we used a measure that did not refer to 
particular pre-defined actions. Instead,  participants first read that sometimes people in 
[Greece/Portugal/Italy] respond to the imposed austerity by engaging in unusual actions that 
are considered by others as destructive because they violate important norms or even break 
the law; and were then asked to indicate their agreement with such actions using three items), 
for example “I consider such destructive actions as legitimate”, “I strongly condemn such 
destructive actions” (reverse-coded) (Greece α = .74, Portugal α = .77, Italy α = .71). 
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Analyses of variance were performed to examine if there were significant differences 
in the measured variables between the countries. One way-ANOVAs indicated that the 
countries significantly differed on all measured variables [national identification: F(2, 738) = 
64.62, p < .001, η2p = .15 ; perceived prejudice: F(2, 738) = 53.89, p < .001, η2p  = .13; 
perceived ostracism: F(2, 738) = 23.58, p < .001, η2p  = .06; anger: F(2, 738) = 48.46, p < 
.001, η2p  = .12; intentions to engage in normative collection action: F(2, 738) = 21.01, p < 
.001, η2p  = .05; support for non-normative action: F(2, 738) = 5.67, p = .004, η2p  = .02]. 
Indicatively, Tukey pairwise comparisons showed that participants in Greece reported greater 
perceived prejudice, ostracism, and normative collective action intentions than participants in 
both Portugal and Italy. Furthermore, participants in Portugal reported higher national 
identification than participants in Greece and Italy, and higher support for destructive action 
than participants in Italy but not those in Greece. Participants in Italy reported higher levels 
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of anger than those in Greece and in Portugal. The exact means, standard deviations and 
differences between the three countries can be found on Table 1.  
Zero-order correlations among the variables in the three countries can be found in 
Table 2. 
Predictors of intentions to engage in normative collective action 
In order to test the hypothesis that national identification predicts intentions to engage 
in collective action via perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger, three three-stage 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted, one for each country, with intentions to 
engage in collective action as the dependent variable. Political orientation was entered at 
stage one of the regression to control for the influence of the variable. National identification 
was entered at stage two, and perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger at stage 
three. The detailed regression statistics for three countries are in Table 3. In the case of 
Greece, political orientation significantly contributed to the regression model, F(1, 216) = 
15.52, p < .001, R2 = .07, while adding national identification led to a statistically significant 
increase in R2, F(1, 215) = 22.44, p < .001, R2 = .16. Adding perceived prejudice, perceived 
ostracism and anger in the regression model led to a further statistically significant increase in 
R2, F(3, 212) = 3.27, p = .022, R2 = .19. When all independent variables were included in 
stage 3 of the regression model, national identification remained a predictor of collective 
action intentions (β = .265, t = 3.956, p < .001), however none of the other predictors were 
significant (perceived prejudice, β = .092, t = 1.276, p = .203; perceived ostracism, β = .115, t 
= 1.647, p = .101; anger, β = .061, t = .966, p = .335).  
In the case of Portugal, political orientation significantly contributed to the regression 
model, F(1, 310) = 52.31, p < .001, R2 = .14, while adding national identification led to a 
statistically significant increase in R2, F(1, 309) = 6.96, p = .009, R2 = .16. Adding perceived 
prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger in the regression model led to a further statistically 
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significant increase in R2, F(3, 306) = 19.12, p < .001, R2 = .30. When all independent 
variables were included in stage 3 of the regression model, national identification remained a 
predictor of collective action intentions (β = .177, t = 3.575, p < .001), as were perceived 
prejudice, β = .121, t = 2.100, p = .037 and anger, β = .311, t = 5.970, p < .001. Perceived 
ostracism was not a significant predictor, β = .024, t = .415, p = .679).  
In the case of Italy, political orientation again significantly contributed to the 
regression model, F(1, 209) = 20.27, p < .001, R2 = .09, and adding national identification led 
to a statistically significant increase in R2, F(1, 208) = 5.37, p = .021, R2 = .11. Adding 
perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger in the regression model led to a further 
statistically significant increase in R2, F(3, 205) = 7.16, p < .001, R2 = .20. When all 
independent variables were included in stage 3 of the regression model, national 
identification remained a predictor of collective action intentions (β = .189, t = 2.878, p = 
.004), as did anger, β = .270, t = 4.004, p < .001. Neither perceived prejudice, β = .096, t = 
1.294, p = .197, not perceived ostracism, β = -.036, t = -.489, p = .626, were significant 
predictors.  
To explore the hypothesised indirect effect of national identification on intentions to 
engage in collective action via the cognitive and affective factors relating to perceived 
disadvantage, mediation models were tested, one for each country. Bootstrapped serial 
mediation analyses (5,000 resamples) were conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS, 
Model 4. National identification was the predictor variable, collective action was the outcome 
variable and perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger were all entered as parallel 
mediators. For all analyses, political orientation was controlled for. Overall, in the case of 
Greece, the direct effect of national identification on collective action was significant (b = 
.23, SE = .06, t = 3.96, p < .001; CI: .12, .35) but no indirect effect emerged as significant. In 
the case of Portugal, the direct effect of national identification was significant (b = .21, SE = 
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.06, t = 3.58, p < .001; CI: .09, .32), while the only significant indirect effect was via anger (b 
= -.06, SEboot = .03; CI: -.12, -.01). Finally, in the case of Italy the direct effect of national 
identification was significant (b = .15, SE = .05, t = 2.88, p = .004; CI: .05, .26) and, as with 
Portugal, the only significant indirect effect was via anger (b = -.04, SEboot = .02; CI: -.08, -
.01). In both countries, higher national identification predicted lower levels of anger, while 
anger predicted more collective action intentions.  
Predictors of support for non-normative collective action 
Analyses were identical to those reported above. This time, however, to account for 
the level of support for disruptive action that derives from support for collective action 
generally, normative collective action intentions was also entered as a control variable in 
stage 1. The detailed regression statistics for the three countries are in Table 4. 
In the case of Greece, political orientation and collective action intentions 
significantly contributed to the regression model, F(2, 215) = 18.93, p < .001, R2 = .15, and 
adding national identification led to a statistically significant increase in R2, F(1, 214) = 7.20, 
p = .008, R2 = .18. Adding perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger in the 
regression model did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 211) = 1.06, p = .365, R2 = 
.19. When all independent variables were included in stage 3 of the regression model, 
national identification negatively predicted support for non-normative collective action (β = -
.197, t = -2.820, p = .005), while perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger were not 
significant predictors (β = .095, t = 1.317, p = .189; β = -.096, t = -1.362, p = .175; β = .051, t 
= .795, p = .421 respectively).  
In the case of Portugal, political orientation and collective action intentions 
significantly contributed to the regression model, F(2, 309) = 29.94, p < .001, R2 = .16, while 
adding national identification led to a statistically significant increase in R2, F(1, 308) = 
13.10, p < .001, R2 = .20. As with Greece, adding perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism 
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and anger in the regression model did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 305) = 
2.45, p = .064, R2 = .22. When all independent variables were included in stage 3 of the 
regression model, national identification again negatively predicted support for non-
normative collective action (β = -.152, t = -2.843, p = .005), while anger positively predicted 
non-normative action support (β = .127, t = 2.172, p = .031). However, perceived prejudice 
and perceived ostracism were not significant predictors (β = -.103, t = -1.688, p = .092; β = 
.039, t = .627, p = .531 respectively).  
Finally, in the case of Italy, political orientation and collective action intentions 
significantly contributed to the regression model, F(2, 208) = 3.79, p = .024, R2 = .04, and 
adding national identification led to a statistically significant increase in R2, F(1, 207) = 9.64, 
p = .002, R2 = .08. As with Greece and Portugal, adding perceived prejudice, perceived 
ostracism and anger in the regression model did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 
204) = .46, p = .710, R2 = .08. When all independent variables were included in stage 3 of the 
regression model, national identification negatively predicted support for non-normative 
collective action (β = -.201, t = -2.813, p = .005), however, perceived prejudice, perceived 
ostracism and anger were not significant predictors (β = -.057, t = -.714, p = .476; β = .090, t 
= 1.132, p = .259 and β = .010, t = .131, p = .896 respectively).  
Bootstrap analyses revealed, in the case of Greece, the direct effect of national 
identification on supporting non-normative collective action was significant (b = -.23, SE = 
.08, t = -2.82, p = .005; CI: -.40, -.07) but no indirect effect emerged as significant. Again, in 
the case of Portugal, the direct effect of national identification was significant (b = -.23, SE = 
.08, t = -2.84, p = .005; CI: -.39, -.07), while the only significant indirect effect was via anger 
(b = -.04, SEboot = .02; CI: -.09, -.01). Higher national identification predicted lower levels of 
anger while anger predicted more support for non-normative action. Finally, in the case of 
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Italy the direct effect of national identification was significant (b = -.20, SE = .07, t = -2.81, p 
= .005; CI: -.35, -.06) and, as with Greece, there were no significant indirect effects.  
Discussion 
 In the context of the financial crisis in the European south, our research explored 
national identification, perceptions of prejudice, perceptions of ostracism, and anger, as 
predictors of intentions to engage in normative and to support non-normative collective 
action in three settings, Greece, Portugal and Italy. The results predominantly demonstrated 
the decisive role of national identification in predicting higher normative collective action 
intentions and less support for non-normative action. In other words, in Greece, Portugal and 
Italy, high levels of national identification against all other variables predicted increased 
intentions to engage in collective action, and also predicted lower support for disruptive 
action. This finding indicates that national identification is a factor that, on the one hand, 
motivates people’s mobilisation but on the other, impedes the more negative, destructive side 
of social action. To our knowledge, this is the first time that this fundamental role of national 
identification has been pointed out in collective action research. Future research should 
further examine these findings by also considering the association between non-normative 
collective action and extreme forms of social identification, such as endorsing extreme 
nationalism. It is important to disentangle, for example, our findings from the violent action 
supported by ultra-right nationalists (e.g., Bjørgo, 1995). We will return to this point later on 
in the discussion.  
 Driven by the perceived disadvantage literature (Walker & Smith, 2002), we focused 
both on the cognitive components of perceived prejudice and ostracism, and the affective 
component of anger. In line with SIMCA, we tested whether national identification exerts its 
effect via perceived prejudice, ostracism and anger. The results of these analyses were mixed, 
in Greece none of the mediations were significant, whereas in Portugal and Italy only anger 
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emerged as a significant mediator (in the case of Italy only for normative collective action). 
Interestingly, in Portugal and Italy, when considering normative collective action, although 
the direct effect of national identification on collective action is positive (i.e. higher levels of 
national identification predict more intentions to engage in collective action) the indirect 
effect was negative (i.e. higher national identification predicted lower levels of anger, which 
was then positively associated with collective action). In other words, for normative 
collective action results provide a complicated picture, such that national identification 
predicts more support for collective action directly and less support for collective action 
indirectly (via anger). This inconsistency is due to the unpredicted negative association in the 
two countries between national identification and anger. 
The fact that national identification is a negative predictor of anger is at first glance a 
surprising finding. According to SIMCA, identification is suggested to exert its effect on 
collective action via increasing anger. Based on our results, however, national identification 
was negatively related to anger, while anger was in turn positively related to collective action 
in both Portugal and Italy. National identification not only predicted lower levels of anger but 
also lower support for disruptive action in the three countries. These results suggest that 
identifying with one’s nation in critical times buffers the negative consequences that stem 
from collective disadvantage in terms of experiencing negative (albeit mobilising) emotions 
such as anger. Additionally, the results suggest that national identification incites people to 
protect the ingroup by not supporting destructive action, which could further perpetuate its 
disadvantaged position. Although this finding is not in line with SIMCA, which has often 
focused on identities that may be marginally important for individuals compared to 
nationality, it is in line with research from individual and interpersonal domains supporting 
the beneficial role of a positive social identity in sustaining mental health and protecting 
against various negative or risky behaviours such as support for violence (Arbona et al., 
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1999; Branscombe et al., 1999). It appears that high levels of national identification motivate 
people to support collective action in order to help their ingroup’s goals but discourage 
people from supporting behaviours that are seen as disruptive and can thus harm the national 
ingroup. Therefore, the results regarding the negative relationship between national 
identification and non-normative action could reflect a strategic decision of disadvantaged 
group members to protect the ingroup, that is to engage in normative action in order to 
improve its standing, but to not approve of behaviours that could entrench further disapproval 
or prejudice against it. Although this explanation may fit the specific context, we 
acknowledge that when violence or destructive action is engrained in the group’s norms, for 
example in the case of some militant groups, engagement in such action may further 
strengthen the group’s goals.  
Our findings point to the contextual and instrumental role of national identity, which 
relates to the threat that is activated in specific contexts. At the time of the data collection, the 
threat of further economic austerity in the countries we examined was salient, and the 
representation of the countries in global media was negative (Capucha, Estêvão, Calado, & 
Capucha, 2014). People in these countries were aware that they were being watched by other 
countries and thus, a strategic component might have influenced their actions; they might 
have cared about their reputation and at the same time tried to influence European Union 
politics. As such, those who “cared” more about their country, i.e. high national identifiers, 
were less supportive of destructive collective action that could motivate further exclusion 
from within or outside the European Union. In this context, normative action is not only more 
justifiable but also more instrumental. At a different context of threat, though, higher 
identification could motivate support for destructive action. Threat from immigration, for 
example, may lead people high in nationalism to engage in destructive action (such as violent 
acts against those perceived as instigating the threat) in an effort to “protect” the country. 
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Therefore, it is crucial to explore the interplay between context (in our research, the specific 
contextual threat) and instrumental actions that aim to change the perceived disadvantage of 
the ingroup (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006).  
Our research focused on national identity and perceived disadvantage in predicting 
social action without exploring efficacy as a further motivator. Efficacy has indeed been 
found to predict collective action intentions and behaviour (for meta-analysis, see Van 
Zomeren et al., 2008). Our research approached collective action from a primarily intergroup 
relations perspective where the chosen predictors related to the “European” versus the 
“national” context, therefore the role of efficacy was not seen as directly relevant (see also 
Van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012 for dual pathway to coping with collective 
disadvantage). However, we acknowledge that efficacy could have also been an important 
predictor of the social mobilisation during the financial crisis in the European south, and it is 
important that future research tests a more exhaustive list of predictors in order to acquire a 
more complete stance on the topic. We also acknowledge that the European financial crisis 
did not only affect Greece, Portugal and Italy but also other European countries such as 
Spain, Cyprus and Ireland, where collective action was also taking place. We do not have 
data from these countries, however the consistent pattern of our results allows us to speculate 
that similar processes might have underlined mobilisation in those countries too. In our 
research we only analysed within-country interindividual variance, and for that we had to 
adopt a conservative approach and analyse the data separately by country. Future research 
may also look at between-country variation, which would, however, require a larger number 
of countries so that multi-level analysis is possible. Additionally, our research did not account 
for the role of other social identities that could also play a role in this context, such as 
identifying with being European, or as trade unionist. Exploring social identities which vary 
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in how inclusive they are (Gkinopoulos & Hegarty (2018) can shed further light into the 
motivators of collective action.    
 Although our hypotheses were theory-driven and our results were largely consistent 
across the three countries with regard to the decisive role of national identification, our 
research is correlational and as such, causality among the variables cannot be inferred. Future 
research can explore the role of national identification in the context of real-life disadvantage 
in a more stringent, experimental design. Becker et al. (2011) showed, for example, that 
participation in radical, non-normative action leads to disidentification from the ingroup, 
especially when the radical action mismatches ingroup norms. Their research measured 
(dis)identification with the ingroup of “student” and “member of the protest movement”. As 
such, it would be interesting to see if engagement with non-normative action also affects 
identification with more meaningful identities such as that of nationality. Drawing upon the 
Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (Reicher, 1996), research can also 
study the dynamic relationship between protesters and the police, and examine the potential 
interplay between national identity and emerging social identities.    
The variance explained by our measured variables was rather small, so future research 
can also delve into the relevant moderators and mediators of the national identification-
collective action relationship. For example, current work by Cakal and colleagues approach 
collective action from an intergroup relations perspective and, following the evidence 
regarding the predictive and moderating role of intergroup contact on the identity-collective 
action path, argue for an integration of the SIMCA and contact theory (Cakal, Hewstone, 
Schwar, & Heath, 2011). Cakal and colleagues also demonstrated that perceived symbolic 
and realistic threats as well as common ingroup perceptions are significant antecedents of 
collective action (Cakal, Eller, Sirlopu, & Perez, 2016; Cakal, Hewstone, Guler, & Heath, 
2016). In the case of our research, one-group representations with the European nations and 
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contact with other European citizens could moderate the path to collective action. Such 
findings can inform the development of research that aims to explore further the role of 
national identification on normative and non-normative action.  
 Examining predictors of not only normative but also non-normative, disruptive action, 
especially in settings of economic or social disadvantage, has important applied implications. 
Violent social mobilisation, including riots and acts of terrorism, has been linked to 
disadvantage and social isolation. A survey of 3,000 young people in the United Kingdom, 
France and Spain showed that those who experienced social marginalisation and 
discrimination were more likely to use violence (European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, 2010). Marginalisation and discrimination were also found to predict attraction to 
fundamentalist groups via feeling a loss of significance (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). Our 
research suggests that a strong sense of national identification in conditions of high threat, 
such as those created under severe financial austerity, can protect against the approval of non-
normative actions. Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers can work together to devise 
interventions that create, enhance and sustain positive identities such as that of a meaningful 
but inclusive national identity. We place particular emphasis on enhancing inclusivity in 
relation to national identity, as this is fundamental in the effort to promote diversity norms 
and pro-immigrant attitudes.  
It is further important to disentangle different forms of non-normative collective 
action and examine possible differing motivations that drive them. For example, support for 
some degree of violence embedded in demonstrations and marches (writing graffiti, etc.) may 
have different instigators compared to support for violence against targets perceived as 
responsible for a situation (physical attacks, arson attacks etc.), or compared to support for 
active terrorism. Understanding the factors that motivate and help sustain support for 
different forms of non-normative action can be a topical and fruitful area of future research.   
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 To summarise, we conducted our research in three European Union countries affected 
by a stern financial crisis, Greece Portugal and Italy. Drawing on perceived disadvantage 
literature and the SIMCA, we explored national identity, as well as cognitive and affective 
components of perceived disadvantage, as predictors of normative collective action intentions 
and non-normative collective action support. Specifically, we tested the predictive role of 
national identification, perceived prejudice, perceived ostracism and anger. Our results 
highlighted consistently among the three countries that high levels of national identification 
predict greater intentions to engage in normative collective action when tested against the 
other predictors. High national identification also predicted less support for disruptive action, 
above and beyond the cognitive and affective components of perceived disadvantage. The 
role of anger was also highlighted as a process driving the effects on mobilisation, and 
interestingly anger was negatively linked to national identification. The theoretical 
contribution of the current research can provide a framework for delving deeper into the 
decisive role of national identification under conditions of threat (in this case it was economic 
austerity), particularly in relation to non-normative collective action. From an applied 
perspective, the results of this research can be utilised in real-world efforts to promote social 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations for the study variables as a function of country 
 Greece Portugal Italy 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
National identification 4.91a 1.29 5.35a 1.05 4.09a 1.45 
Perceived prejudice 5.13a 1.10 4.01a 1.28 4.28a 1.29 
Perceived ostracism 3.84a 1.41 3.39a 1.49 2.88a 1.41 
Anger 5.30a 1.21 4.49a 1.56 5.68a 1.40 
Collective action 4.71a 1.14 4.30a 1.24 3.97a 1.18 
Destructive action 3.36a 1.54 3.40b 1.58 2.97a,b 1.47 




Table 2. Correlations among variables in Greece, Portugal and Italy 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Greece 1. National 
identification 
- .28*** .15* .09 .21** -.15* 
 2. Perceived prejudice  - .46*** .19** .20** .06 
 3. Perceived ostracism   - .19** .19** -.01 
 4. Anger    - .08 .05 
 5. Normative action     - .34*** 
 6. Non-normative 
action 
     - 
Portugal 1. National 
identification 
- .09 -.09 -.17** .11p=.058 -.16** 
 2. Perceived prejudice  - .53*** .22*** .23*** .01 
 3. Perceived ostracism   - .33*** .20*** .11p=.051 
 4. Anger    - .38*** .28*** 
 5. Normative action     - .37*** 
 6. Non-normative 
action 
     - 
Italy 1. National 
identification 
- .10 -.04 -.19** .09  -19** 
 2. Perceived prejudice  - .51*** .22** .13p=.053 .00 
 3. Perceived ostracism   - .23** .04 .08 
 4. Anger    - .29*** .11 
 5. Normative action     - .19** 
 6. Non-normative 
action 
     - 





Table 3. Hierarchical multiple regressions predicting intentions to engage in normative collective action in Greece, Portugal and Italy 
  Normative action 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Variable β t β t β t 
Greece Political orientation -.26 -3.94*** -.35 -5.35*** -.36 -5.54*** 
 National identification   .31 4.74*** .27 3.96*** 
 Perceived prejudice     .09 1.28 
 Perceived ostracism     .12 1.65 
 Anger     .06 .97 
 F-change 15.21***  22.44***  3.27*  
 R .23  .39  .44  
 R2 .07  .16  .19  
 R2∆ .07  .09  .04  
Portugal Political orientation -.38 -7.23*** -.39 -7.49*** -.34 -6.86*** 
 National identification   .14 2.64** .18 3.58***  
 Perceived prejudice     .12 2.10* 
 Perceived ostracism     .02 .42 
 Anger     .31 5.97*** 
 F-change 52.31***  6.96**  19.12***  
 R .38  .40  .54  
 R2 .14  .16  .30  
 R2∆ .14  .02  .13  
Italy Political orientation -.30 -4.50*** -.32 -4.91*** -.30 -4.61*** 
 National identification   .15 2.32* .19 2.88** 
 Perceived prejudice     .10 1.29 
 Perceived ostracism     -.04 -.49 
 Anger     .27 4.04*** 
 F-change 20.27***  5.34*  7.16***  
 R .30  .33  .44  
 R2 .09  .11  .20  
 R2∆ .09  .02  .08  




Table 4. Hierarchical multiple regressions predicting support for non-normative collective action in Greece, Portugal and Italy 
   Non-normative action 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
 Variable β t β t β t 
Greece Political orientation -.19 -2.85** -.12 -1.69 -.12 -1.77 
 Normative action .30 4.53*** .35 5.20*** .35 5.04*** 
 National identification   -.18 -2.68** -.20 -2.82** 
 Perceived prejudice     .10 1.32 
 Perceived ostracism     -.10 -1.36 
 Anger     .05 .80 
 F-change 18.93***  7.20**  1.06  
 R .39  .42  .44  
 R2 .15  .18  .19  
 R2∆ .15  .03  .01  
Portugal Political orientation -.17 -2.97** -.14 -2.53* -.13 -2.41* 
 Normative action .31 5.48*** .34 6.07*** .31 5.06*** 
 National identification   -.19 -3.62*** -.15 -2.84** 
 Perceived prejudice     -.10 -1.69 
 Perceived ostracism     .04 .63 
 Anger     .13 2.17* 
 F-change 29.94***  13.10***  2.45p=.064  
 R .40  .44  .46  
 R2 .16  .19  .22  
 R2∆ .16  .03  .02  
Italy Political orientation -.02 -.33 .03 .39 .02 .26 
 Normative action .18 2.51* .21 3.02** .21 2.85** 
 National identification   -.21 -3.10** -.20 -2.81** 
 Perceived prejudice     -.06 -.71 
 Perceived ostracism     .09 1.13 
 Anger     .01 .13 
 F-change 3.79*  9.64**  .46  
 R .19  .28  .29  
 R2 .04  .08  .08  
 R2∆ .04  .04  .01  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
